To give a productive and low-overhead assurance to keep forwarded routing messages from being fashioned, we propose the utilization of the Distributed Routing Message Tracing and Authentication intrusion detection model (DRETA). In the first place, DRETA has a distributed design, in which every hub has a detector to screen and accept routing messages with one another autonomously. Additionally, not at all like numerous safe routing protocols, DRETA has a free layer, isolated from the network layer, which intercepts routing messages and does not require the change of the routing protocol. Second, DRETA utilizes symmetric keys, which require much lower calculation overhead than public keys, to give authentication administrations to all routing messages. DRETA embraces one-way keychain and delay key revelation strategies to permit symmetric keys to be conveyed in public channels like Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) does. Third, DRETA proposes the utilization of Validation Messages (VMs), which utilize HMAC to secure the integrity of forwarded messages. While the sender forwards a forwarded message to the receiver, the sender additionally declares the Previous Forwarder (PF), the individual who already sent the message to the sender. DRETA utilizes Previous Forwarder to engender the keys and VMs to follow and guarantee the exactness of routing proof conveyed in the forwarded messages, utilizing minimal message overhead. In this way, DRETA is an adaptable, effective, and nonspecific arrangement which utilizes low overhead to ensure the integrity and authenticity of sent routing messages in MANET. We actualize DRETA on two agent routing protocols, AODV and OLSR